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[37] 
Who Should Regulate Data?: An Analysis of 
the California Consumer Privacy Act and Its 
Effects on Nationwide Data Protection Laws 
NICHOLAS F. PALMIERI III 
Introduction 
While companies were still reeling from passage of the European 
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),1 the California 
legislature decided to enact its own data protection2 statute, the California 
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA).3 While not nearly as 
comprehensive as the GDPR, the CCPA provides significant insight into 
the ongoing trend towards data protection which can be seen throughout the 
world and into how that trend is affecting laws within the United States.4 
The CCPA was passed hastily by the California legislature in order to 
prevent an even more stringent ballot initiative from being passed.5 As a 
result, it contained a myriad of uncertainties and faced significant 
 
 1.  Regulation (EU) 2016/679, On the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data and On the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter 
GDPR]. In fact, companies still have not even fully adjusted to the GDPR’s stringent 
requirements and face fines for such failures. See Michael Mittel, What We Can Learn From 
the GDPR’s First Fines, CMS WIRE (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.cmswire.com/informa 
tion-management/what-we-can-learn-from-the-gdprs-first-fines/.  
 2.  Scholarship in this area refers, usually interchangeably, to both data privacy and 
data protection. This paper will simply use the term data protection to cover both terms, 
although there are some slight differences between the two concepts. See STEPHEN COBB, 
DATA PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION: US LAW & LEGISLATION 1 (2016). 
 3.  CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.192 (West 2018) [hereinafter CCPA].  
 4.  See Sarah L. Lode, Note, “You Have the Data” . . . The Writ of Habeas Data and 
Other Data Protection Rights: Is the United States Falling Behind?, 94 IND. L.J. 
SUPPLEMENT 41, 58–63 (2018).  
 5.  See John Stevens, California Consumer Privacy Act, ABA (July 2, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/bcl/
2019/201902/fa_9/. 
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criticisms.6 While some amendments are changing these issues,7 they do 
not change the overall picture presented by the CCPA. Although it is a 
ground-breaking law which will have ramifications throughout the country, 
if not the world, the CCPA still requires scrutiny before it should be 
completely accepted and modelled by the rest of the nation.8 
Six significant amendments have been passed by the California 
legislature and recently signed into law by the governor.9 While this paper 
is not intended to go into great detail on each of them, this brief overview 
will help to put them into context and inform some analysis of the law. 
First, A.B. 25 provides exceptions for information related to human 
resource purposes of a business, including information about an applicant, 
information related to emergency contacts, and information to help 
distribute and administer benefits.10 A.B. 874 broadens the definition of 
personal information to include any information which may reasonably 
capable of being associated with a particular person or household.11 
However, it also remotes from the definition any de-identified or aggregate 
consumer information.12 
A.B. 1564 mandates companies to provide at least two means for 
customers to submit requests for information, including a toll-free phone 
 
 6.  See Hogan Lovells, California Consumer Privacy Act: The Challenge Ahead, 
LEXOLOGY: CHRONICLE OF DATA PROTECTION (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/ 
library/detail.aspx?g=ac6d94a0-0b7d-41a4-8d76-7b6cfa5f4d8d. 
 7.  CCPA Amendment Tracker, IAPP (Sept. 18, 2019), https://iapp.org/resources/ 
article/ccpa-amendment-tracker/. The most relevant of these amendments will be discussed 
below, see infra Part 0. 
 8.  As it stands, other states are already beginning to copy California. See Rachel R. 
Marmor, Maryam Casbarro, Monder Khoury, Nancy Libin, and Helen Goff Foster, 
“Copycat CCPA” Bills Introduced in States Across Country, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAIN LLP 
(Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/privacy—security-law-blog/2019/02/copycat-
ccpa-bills-introduced-in-states-across-cou.  
 9.  Hunton Andrews Kurth, Majority of CCPA Amendment Bills Passed by California 
Legislature, PRIVACY & INFO. SECURITY BLOG (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.huntonprivacy 
blog.com/2019/09/16/majority-of-ccpa-amendment-bills-passed-by-california-legislature/; 
see also Deborah A. George, California CCPA Update: Here’s What Passed, NAT’L L. REV. 
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/california-ccpa-amendment-update-
here-s-what-passed. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  See Angelica A. Zabanal, California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) 




3 - PALMIERI_HSTLJ11-1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/4/2019  9:57 AM 
Winter 2020] WHO SHOULD REGULATE DATA? 39 
number and a website submission form.13 At the same time, it grants an 
exception to businesses that only operate exclusively online can provide 
just an email address for customers to use in order to submit information 
requests.14 A.B. 1146 provides (yet another) exception to a company’s 
deletion requirement, allowing companies to keep data necessary for 
various possible warranties.15 
A.B. 1355, perhaps the lengthiest amendment, has a few significant 
provisions. First, it clarifies that businesses need only inform customers 
that they may request certain specific information, instead of requiring 
disclosure of the actual information by the business.16 It also allows for a 
business to require a verifiable consumer request before disclosing certain 
information, although it doesn’t go into detail on what type of verification 
is allowed.17 Finally, this amendment also clarifies the CCPA’s anti-
discrimination provision, switching the focus from the value provided to 
the business rather than the to the consumer.18 
This paper will proceed in three parts. Part I will analyze the CCPA as 
it currently stands under a previously developed three-part framework: data 
stewardship, a balance of harms, and redressability19 While the legislature 
is free to amend the CCPA further before it comes into effect on January 1, 
2020, evaluating the law as is currently stands can provide insight into the 
minds of the California legislature as well as how companies within the 
United States as a whole are currently approaching data protection. 
Part II will discuss potential constitutional challenges to the CCPA as 
well as arguments to overcome those challenges. In particular, this paper 
will look at two primary constitutional doctrines: first, the Dormant 
Commerce Clause,20 and in particular how the prevalence of geolocation 
data affects this issue;21 second, First Amendment issues.22 Analysis of 
 
 13.  Kurth, supra note 9.  
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Nicholas F. Palmieri III, Note, Data Protection in an Increasingly Globalized 
World, 94 IND. L.J. 297, 298–306 (2019). This three-part framework is itself derived from a 
five-part framework developed by Fred Cate for analysis of Big Data specifically. Fred H. 
Cate, Big Data, Consent, and the Future of Data Protection, in BIG DATA IS NOT A 
MONOLITH 3 (Cassidy R. Sugimoto, Hamid R. Ekbia & Michael Mattioli eds., 2016).  
 20.  See generally Amy M. Petragnani, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last 
Leg, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1215 (1994). 
 21.  See Tony Glosson, Data Privacy in Our Federalist System: Toward an Evaluative 
Framework for State Privacy Laws, 67 FED. COMM. L.J. 409, 420–32 (2015). 
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these doctrines suggests that the CCPA will likely have significant 
difficulties overcoming the challenges presented here, particularly because 
it provides little benefit in return for imposing significant burden on out-of-
state actors.23 
Finally, Part III will examine and summarize the previous spread of 
data breach notification laws throughout the United States,24 and analogize 
it to the possible passage of laws similar to the CCPA amongst the other 49 
states. 
Ultimately, while the CCPA is a step in the right direction with regard 
to data protection, it ultimately falls short of having the same sweeping, 
protective scope that the GDPR has achieved. The CCPA does provide 
some very significant protections for consumers, but suffers from serious 
drawbacks as well. The law will face significant constitutional challenges, 
and likely spawn a number of similar, but distinct, laws that may be 
difficult (if not impossible) to comply with. 
Evaluating the Current CCPA 
Before analyzing whether the CCPA will survive constitutional 
challenges and spur the spread of similar laws throughout the country, one 
must first determine whether or not a law like the CCPA is even 
worthwhile. While objectively determining the “worth” of a data protection 
law is difficult, this paper will apply a three-part framework designed to 
analyze the function and efficacy of data protection laws during three main 
stages. First, the data stewardship element looks at the collection phase, 
that is, under what circumstances companies are allowed to collect personal 
data25 in the first place, and the security requirements for storing that data 
once it is collected.26 Second, the balance of harms element looks at the use 
 
 22.  See Jane E. Kirtley, The EU Data Protection Directive and the First Amendment: 
Why a “Press Exemption” Won’t Work, 80 IOWA L. REV. 639, 643–46 (1995).  
 23.  But see Stephen J. Astringer, The Endless Bummer: California’s Latest Attempt to 
Protect Children Online is Far Out(side) Effective, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 271 (2015); E. Wesley Campbell, But It’s Written in Pen: The Constitutionality of 
California’s Internet Eraser Law, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 583 (2015).  
 24.  See Jill Joerling, Data Breach Notification Laws: An Argument for a 
Comprehensive Federal Law to Protect Consumer Data, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 467, 
471–81 (2010); see also Daniel J. Marcu, The Data Breach Dilemma: Proactive Solutions 
for Protecting Consumers’ Personal Information, 68 DUKE L.J. 555 (2018). 
 25.  For the purposes of this paper, the term “personal data” describes any information 
that can be used to identify a single individual as well as data that refers to such an 
individual, without explicitly identifying that person. Robert Kirk Walker, Note, The Right 
to be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 257, 260 n.5 (2012). 
 26.  Palmieri, supra note 19, at 297–99. 
3 - PALMIERI_HSTLJ11-1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/4/2019  9:57 AM 
Winter 2020] WHO SHOULD REGULATE DATA? 41 
phase, namely how a company decides whether the risks of particular data 
processing outweigh the benefits of that processing.27 Third, the redress 
element looks at the problem phase, examining what solutions are available 
to persons (or even organizations) whose data has been mishandled or 
misidentified.28 None of these elements exist alone, and each depends on, 
informs upon, and influences the other two, making strict application of 
any single element in the framework a difficult task, though it helps to 
provide insight into individual aspects of a law which need improvement. 
Data Stewardship 
The data stewardship element has two main focuses. First, it considers 
under what circumstances a company may collect personal data. Currently, 
one of the primary ways that most countries allow for collection of 
personal data is via privacy policies, which obtain the consent of the 
consumer before personal data is collected and used. While this has 
become standard practice across multiple industries,29 supposedly because 
it “place[s] the individual at the center of decision-making about personal 
information use,” such consent is rarely actually “informed.”30 In reality, 
consumers rarely make themselves aware of the circumstances surrounding 
collection of their data, the nature of the data collected, or the uses to which 
their data will be put.31 As a result, users often find themselves agreeing 
automatically to various clickwrap agreements, without taking any time 
whatsoever to consider the consequences of that consent.32 
An additional problem with a consent-based model of data processing 
is that many websites operate on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.33 Under such 
 
 27.  Id. at 300–02. 
 28.  Id. at 302–04.  
 29.  James P. Nehf, Incomparability and the Passive Virtues of Ad Hoc Privacy Policy, 
76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 4–18 (2005). 
 30.  Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
1607, 1660 (1999).  
 31.  Id. at 1683; see also Neil Richards & Woodrow Harding, The Pathologies of 
Digital Consent, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 32.  See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006); see also 
Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Privacy, the Hacker Way, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 62 (2013). 
Clickwrap agreements, where a user must expressly consent to the agreement before using a 
website, should be distinguished from browsewrap websites, whereby “consent” is implied 
from continued use of a website, whose terms are not always enforceable. See Kathryn 
McMahon, Tell the Smart House to Mind Its Own Business: Maintaining Privacy and 
Security in the Era of Smart Devices, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511, 2536 (2018). 
 33.  See Richards & Harding, supra note 31, at 28–34 (discussing the concept, and 
illegitimacy, or coerced consent).  
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a model, users are confronted with the choice either to accept a website or 
company’s collection of their personal data, or to go without using that 
service. In today’s modern world, many Internet-based services are simply 
necessary to life, leaving consumers no choice but to “consent” to 
collection of their data or go without a necessary service in their lives.34 
Second, this element considers how that data is stored and a 
company’s duty to properly manage and protect any personal data in its 
possession (separate from how it may or may not use that data for any data 
processing). This is, in reality, the far more important focus when it comes 
to collection of personal data. As previously discussed, data collection 
based on consent has significant weaknesses. As such, consumers—who in 
their everyday lives have little time (and thus inclination) to worry about 
the potential risks of data processing, the categories of data collected, or 
sometimes even who is collecting their data35—would be far better 
protected by setting up a minimum standard of applies to all companies and 
upon which consumers may rely.36 In this way, companies can be 
incentivized—in various ways—to set up proper infrastructure to protect 
personal data, rather than merely relying on user consent agreements to 
avoid liability for misuse or misallocation of personal data.37 
Under the first consideration, the CCPA falls extremely short, 
especially when compared to laws like the GDPR. The CCPA contains no 
provisions which define the actual circumstances under which a company 
can collect personal data, nor does it define specific criteria which must be 
met in order for data collection to occur.38 While the GDPR is far from 
perfect,39 it at least allows for multiple circumstances by which a company 
can become legally authorized to collect personal data, beyond mere 
consent of users.40 While the data stewardship element seeks definition of 
more than mere conditions for legal collection of data, having at least some 
predefined conditions gives minimal notice to (interested) users that their 
 
 34.  Tanith Balaban, Comprehensive Data Privacy Legislation: Why Now is the Time, 1 
CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 24 (2009). 
 35.  See Schwartz, supra note 30.  
 36.  Palmieri, supra note 19, at 309. 
 37.  See, e.g., Jeff Kosseff, Positive Cybersecurity Law: Creating a Consistent and 
Incentive Based System, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 401 (2016) (suggesting a tax incentive which 
encourages proactive data security); see also Matwyshyn, supra note 32, at 48 (suggesting a 
new standard of “digital usability and quiet enjoyment” with respect to collection and 
storage of personal data).  
 38.  CYNTHIA J. COLE & NEIL COULSON, BAKER BOTTS LLP, CALIFORNIA V. GDPR: 
COMPARE AND CONTRAST (2018). 
 39.  Palmieri, supra note 19, at 307–8 
 40.  GDPR, supra note 1, art. 6.  
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personal data could be collected and provides a moderately easily 
accessible means of determining exactly how and why their data was 
collected in the first place. 
The CCPA’s merits do not improve greatly when looking at the 
second focus of the data stewardship element. While it does mandate that a 
company which collects personal data keep track of various information—
categories of data collected and sold, categories of sources of personal data, 
purpose of collection, and specific pieces of personal data collected41—
there are no real baseline security measures that are mandated for 
companies which collect personal data. While some may argue that the 
market would adequately punish companies who do not properly protect 
personal data,42 such ex post facto reliance fails to take into account one of 
the most basic considerations of data protection laws: to prevent the free 
dissemination (and thus misuse) of personal data in the first place. Because 
of the ease with which personal data can be spread across the globe as well 
as the ample harms that can arise from misuse of that data,43 it is imperative 
that companies be incentivized, on the front-end, to prevent any possible 
data breaches, rather than merely being punished after the fact of a data 
breach, since gauging adequate compensation in the event of a data breach 
is very difficult. 
The CCPA amendments, signed October 11th, 2019, 44 influence this 
element, but do not change the CCPA’s overall outlook. While A.B. 874 
might broaden the range of information that is covered by the CCPA, it 
does not address any of the underlying concerns which consumers should 
be concerned with. In addition, A.B. 25 weakens the data protection of the 
CCPA, since it gives employers significantly more freedom to collect and 
use the personal information of their employees. While true that the CCPA 
is focused at the protection of consumers, the fact that legislators have 
chosen to specifically exclude employees from the scope of some CCPA 
protections goes a long way towards showing that the CCPA is, at its heart, 
a data transparency bill rather than a data protection bill. 
As such, the CCPA definitively fails the data stewardship element of 
this framework, since, beyond the most cursory tracking and recording of 
 
 41.  CCPA § 1798.110(c).  
 42.  See, e.g., Mark Burdon, Contextualizing the Tensions and Weaknesses of 
Information Privacy and Data Breach Notification Laws, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 63 (2011). 
 43.  See generally Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A 
Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737 (2018). 
 44.  Jeewon Kim Serrato & Susan Ross, And then There Were Five: CCPA 
Amendments Pass Legislature, Data Protection Rep. (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.datapro 
tectionreport.com/2019/10/california-governor-signs-all-5-ccpa-amendments. 
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personal data collected/sold, it provides essentially no guidance to (1) 
consumers with respect to the circumstances under which their personal 
data can be collected and (2) businesses with respect to minimum 
safeguards which they would need to implement in order to assure 
consumers that personal data will be adequately protected. 
Balance of Harms 
Once personal data has been collected, businesses are tasked with the 
difficult decision of what, exactly, they should (and oftentimes could) do 
with that data. For example, companies could (theoretically) choose to 
process that data themselves, sell the data to third parties, or simply store 
the data until a better opportunity presents itself. Accompanying all of 
these options, though, are potential harms, both to the consumers whose 
personal data is being used, and even to the company using that data. As 
such, any sufficient data protection law must lay out a system by which 
companies can balances the potential harms of data processing with the 
benefits and therefore determine the correct course of action to take.45 
In enumerating these factors, a government must carefully balance the 
breadth of harms it chooses to specify, in order to avoid alienating potential 
businesses and consumers,46 the benefits, to which companies themselves 
will almost always look at in as positive a light as possible, and thus could 
potentially give such benefits more weight than they are due.47 This 
enumeration has the added benefit of allowing consumers themselves to 
correctly set their expectations, since it allows them to determine both the 
risks posed by collection and use of their personal data as well as the 
potential benefits a company stands to gain by use of that personal data, 
giving them leverage in potential negotiations.48 
Of course, both the harms and benefits of data processing can depend 
heavily on the industry used, a fact implicit in the United States’ current 
sector-specific approach to data protection.49 Therefore another important 
consideration for any adequate data protection law is that it has in place 
appropriate safeguards to prevent, or at least regulate, cross-industry 
sharing of data. These safeguards prevent any type of “race to the bottom” 
 
 45.  Palmieri, supra note 19, at 302.  
 46.  Id. at 303. 
 47.  Cf. ORLA LYNSKEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW (2015). 
 48.  See Ctr. for Info. Policy Leadership, The Role of Risk Management in Data 
Protection 13 (2014) https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/uploads/5/7/1/0/57104281/ 
protecting_privacy_in_a_world_of_big_data_paper_2_the_role_of_risk_management_16_fe
bruary_2016.pdf.  
 49.  See Burdon, supra note 42, at 83–86. 
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when it comes to data processing.50 Without such a cross-industry shield, 
the least regulated industries would be free to sell sensitive personal data to 
more regulated industries who might otherwise have difficulty collecting 
such data in the first place. 
Unfortunately, the CCPA again fails to adequately fulfill this element. 
In the first place, while it seems to implicitly recognize that personal data 
misuse can lead to various harm, it does nothing to address what these 
harms may be or how businesses can minimize them, although the CCPA is 
not alone in this failure.51 There are likely various reasons for the 
California legislature’s failure in the regard. First of all, the CCPA is 
specifically targeted to protect consumers, not quite to regulate business 
(although that is obviously a result of the law).52 Therefore, the law should 
not be expected to set forth industry standards of safety so much as to 
empower citizens to protect their own personal data. 
Second, the California legislature passed the CCPA relatively quickly, 
in order to prevent a similar measure from making its way to the California 
ballot, so legislators would be unlikely to have wanted to spend the time 
necessary to enumerate a list of myriad potential harms and benefits.53 
Finally, within the United States, exists the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework, a nonbinding set of standards intended to help businesses 
maintain a certain minimum standard of data security.54 The NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework suggests that businesses create their own system 
of balancing harms and benefits and provides minimal guidance to do so.55 
Ultimately, the CCPA provides no guidance to businesses who 
deliberate whether on balance, certain processing activity is worth the risk. 
Without that guidance, businesses will likely continue to operate with 
 
 50.  See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU 
and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE. J. INT’L 
L. 1 (2000). 
 51.  See K.A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to 
Make Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 11 (2003). 
 52.  Kevin F. Cahill, David J. Harris, Mark Browne, Hilary Bonaccorsi & Colleen 
Hespeler, California Consumer Privacy Act: Potential Impact and Key Takeways, 30 
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 11, 11 (2018). 
 53.  See Rita Heimes & Sam Pfeifle, New California Privacy Law to Affect More Than 
Half a Million US Companies, IAPP (July 2, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/new-california-
privacy-law-to-affect-more-than-half-a-million-us-companies/.  
 54.  NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (2018). 
 55.  See Palmieri, supra note 19, at 325–26. 
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impunity, using or selling personal data with little oversight, resulting in 
data abuse.56 
Redressability 
The final element of the three-part framework—redressability—
examines what procedures and safeguards are in place to ensure consumers 
have access to personal data held by companies, which means exist to 
effectively respond to improper use of their data, and the ability to correct 
erroneously collected or stored data.57 
Primarily existing to provide transparency to consumers, the CCPA 
excels at addressing redressability as it contains several provisions that 
allow consumers to not only see what data is held by companies, but also 
whom the data has been sold to and the use of the data.58 The sweeping 
scope of the CCPA provisions allow consumers to determine which 
companies have purchased, collected, or used their personal data, at a 
relatively low cost and within a reasonable period of time. These provisions 
serve as a useful tool for consumers to ensure the safety and privacy of 
their data. 
In addition to its ample transparency provisions, the CCPA also 
provides two additional means of redress. First, the CPPA grants 
consumers the right to request companies to delete,59 any personal data that 
the company holds. While this right is incredibly important, within the 
context of the CCPA it loses some of its force. First of all, the CCPA 
allows for nine exceptions to the right to delete, which allow a business to 
retain personal data even after receiving a “verifiable request” for 
deletion.60 One of these exceptions is most likely to be the source of most 
problems for consumers; the “Internal Use” exception61 allows for 
noncompliance with a deletion request whenever the data is being used 
purely for internal uses that are aligned with the consumer’s expectations. 
Under this exception, a business could, in theory, remain free to retain any 
personal data which it was using internally for its own processing, in spite 
of any deletion requests it receives. 
 
 56.  But see Palmieri, supra note 19, at 325 (suggesting that, despite a lack of actual 
data protection regulation, the FTC has stepped forward as a de facto watch dog for data 
protection in the United States).  
 57.  Palmieri, supra note 19, at 304–05.  
 58.  CCPA §§ 1798.110, 1798.115, 1798.130.   
 59.  Id. § 1798.105. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. § 1798.105(d)(7). 
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The right to deletion also loses much of its force when one realizes 
that it merely controls what a single company does. While a verifiable 
request for deletion does require a business to “direct any service 
providers” to also delete personal data,62 there is no follow up necessary or 
assurance required on the part of the business. As far as a single business is 
concerned, once it passes along the request its obligation is met. This 
places a huge burden on the consumer, who must now follow up with every 
single company to whom their personal data has been sold to ensure their 
compliance with the deletion request. Increasing this cost essentially 
ensures that consumers will be unable or unwilling to properly see to the 
deletion of their personal data, resulting in mass proliferation of personal 
data which they will be almost powerless to stop.63 
But the right to deletion is not a citizen’s only means of redress. The 
CCPA also guarantees a right for consumers to “opt-out” of sale of their 
information to third parties.64 Unlike the right to deletion, this provision is 
not riddled with myriad exceptions and a business is required to provide 
notice of sale to any third party as well as notice of the right to opt out of 
similar sales in the future.65 In general, once a consumer has given direction 
to a business not to sell their personal data, a business is bound by that 
request.66 However, opt out rights are far from an ideal solution.67 Similar 
to the issues of informed consent discussed earlier, opt out provisions 
require a certain level of attention and proactive action on the part of 
consumers.68 Creating this extra work for the consumer shifts the costs of 
data processing back to the consumer, rather than the business, who is in 
the best position both to manage personal data and to prevent its sale. 
Ideally, data protection laws should not unduly burden consumers with 
protection of their own data, rather they should focus on placing the burden 
of proper data protection on businesses, who often stand to gain the most 
from proper data processing techniques.69 
 
 62.  Id. § 1798.105(c). 
 63.  See Palmieri, supra note 19, at 305. 
 64.  CCPA § 1798.120. 
 65.  Id. § 1798.120(b). 
 66.  Id. § 1798.120(c). 
 67.  See Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to 
Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 599, 615–16 (2015). 
 68.  See Richard Lawne & Yuli Takatsuki, CCPA Blog Series, Part 3: Confused over 
opt-out rights? You’re not alone, FIELDFISHER (Apr. 16, 2019), https://privacylawblog.field 
fisher.com/2019/ccpa-blog-series-part-3-confused-over-opt-out-rights. 
 69.  See Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort 
Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 133–37 (2003). 
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Again, the CCPA amendments provide only minimal relief in this 
regard. A.B. 1564 does create additional guarantees that consumers will be 
able to determine what data companies have, but A.B. 1355 reverses the 
benefit of that slightly by putting further burdens on the consumers. First, 
consumer requests must be specific for what data they are seeking, creating 
an additional hurdle which they must overcome. In addition, for certain 
data, companies are able to demand a verified request by the consumer. 
This requirement, again, puts an extra burden on consumers and will likely 
stifle attempts by any but the most determined consumers to understand 
who has their data. 
Looking at the CCPA as a whole, it is clear that it functions primarily 
as a transparency law. Doing little to regulate how businesses collect 
personal data or what they may do with that data once it is collected, the 
law focuses greatly on allowing consumers to determine what personal data 
is being held by various businesses. While the law does, in theory allow for 
consumers to both request deletion of particular data and the opt out of the 
sale of their data, these rights are severely limited by both exceptions to 
those rights as well as the creation of undue burdens on consumer to 
exercise those rights. Ultimately, though, while the CCPA is not perfect 
and is not nearly as comprehensive as the GDPR, it is a step in the right 
direction and American consumers are likely to desire such a transparency 
law to be active in their everyday lives. 
Potential Constitutional Challenges to the CCPA 
Now that the CCPA has been analyzed on its own, this paper will 
address particular constitutional challenges most likely to target 
California’s new law. Before analyzing those challenges, though, it is 
important to consider who would bring those challenges in the first place. 
The first primary challenger would be the Federal government itself. Either 
because the government wishes to enact its own federal law or because it 
simply doesn’t wish for states to regulate the area of data protection, the 
federal government is currently the most likely to target the CCPA in an 
attempt to invalidate it. The second, less likely, challengers, would be large 
businesses, who do not wish to comply with the new regulation. However, 
the types of large, multinational corporations with the resources to truly 
challenge the CCPA are also already subject to the (much more stringent) 
provisions of the GDPR.70 Therefore, from a publicity point of view, it is 
much more useful for large companies to now support the CCPA, since 
 
70. How Google, Amazon, Facebook, and More are Addressing GDPR, LINEATE (Mar. 23, 
2018), https://lineate.com/how-google-amazon-facebook-and-more-are-addressing-gdpr/. 
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they are already under harsher restrictions within the European Union and 
support of the CCPA will show consumers that these companies truly care 
about protecting personal data.71 
Moving to the actual constitutional challenges now, the first 
constitutional doctrine to be levied against the CCPA is likely to be the 
Dormant Commerce Clause (DCC). The primary purpose of the DCC is to 
prevent the states from creating significant barriers to interstate trade in the 
absence of action by Congress.72 While the Age of the Internet has made it 
much more prevalent for state laws to have effects in different areas,73 that 
does not mean that all state regulations are preempted by the DCC. The 
second constitutional challenge to the CCPA will likely come in the form 
of a First Amendment challenge. While regulations that specifically target 
consumers with special interests, in particular minors, are often 
constitutional,74 since the CCPA targets all consumers, restriction on 
commercial speech in that context faces harsher obstacles.75 
The Dormant Commerce Clause 
Under the Supreme Court’s precedent, the primary purpose of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause (DCC) is to prevent state laws which 
discriminate against out-of-state actors.76 Laws which facially discriminate 
against out-of-state actors are presumptively invalid.77 However, if the law 
 
71. See Andrea O’Sullivan, Sundar Pichai: Google Supports American Data Privacy Law, 
REASON (Dec. 18, 2018), https://reason.com/archives/2018/12/18/sundar-pichai-goog le-
supports-an-america; see also Nicole Lindsey, Why the Tech Industry is Pushing for a 
Federal Privacy Law, CPO (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-privacy/w 
hy-the-tech-industry-is-pushing-for-a-federal-privacy-law/; see also 24 Tech Companies 
Back CCPA Amendment to Make It Stronger: Privacy for All Act of 2019, SPREADPRIVACY 
(Apr. 16, 2019), https://spreadprivacy.com/ccpa-privacy-for-all-act/ (arguing that companies 
have begun to show support for a single national data protection law within the United 
States because they would rather comply with a single nationwide law than fifty individual 
state laws).  
 72.  Petragnoni, supra note 20, at 1215-16.  
 73.  See American Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(suggesting that the “nature” of internet communications is interstate). 
 74.  See Campbell supra note 23, at 584–85. 
 75.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–566 
(1980) (laying out a four-part analysis for determining the constitutional of commercial 
speech regulations).  
 76.  CTS Corps. V. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987).  
 77.  See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 788–89 (2001); see also Astringer, supra note 23, at 279 (stating that facially 
discriminatory state laws are “per se invalid”); but see Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 
Wis., 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (suggesting that strict scrutiny is the proper standard for facially 
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is not facially discriminatory, then the law is subject to the so-called Pike 
Balancing test, which considers four questions: (1) does the statute regulate 
evenhandedly?; (2) Does the statute effectuate a legitimate purpose; (3) Are 
its effects on interstate commerce incidental?; (4) Is the burden created 
clearly in excess in relation to the local putative benefits?78 Additionally, 
regardless of the Pike balancing test, state legislation can still be 
invalidated where the “practical effect of the regulation is to control 
conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”79 
Applying the Pike test to the CCPA, it would likely be able to pass 
constitutional scrutiny. Regarding the first question, the CCPA clearly 
regulates evenhandedly. It would apply identically to both out-of-state and 
in-state actors and does not treat data protection differently based on the 
location of that data, rather focusing on protection of California based 
consumers. With respect to the second question, the protection of personal 
data is certainly a legitimate state interest.80 Especially here, where the 
legislature has specifically set out that a right to privacy is fundamental to 
all Californians.81 The CCPA does encounter some issues when considering 
the third question, whether its effects are incidental. The effects here are 
more than merely incidental, they would in fact be a primary part of the 
legislation. Companies seeking to do business in California, whose massive 
economy most companies would wish to utilize, must comply with this act, 
meaning effects on interstate commerce would likely be primary, not 
incidental.82 The final question would also weigh heavily against the 
CCPA, since burden imposed by the law might be found to be clearly 
excessive in relation to its benefits. As discussed earlier, there are actually 
very few real benefits that the CCPA creates for California consumers. 
While transparency in data collection and processing is an important goal, 
it truly imparts very few actual benefits on consumers without also 
 
discriminatory state laws). An argument might be made that any state law attempting to 
regulate the internet is facially discriminatory, such an argument is beyond the scope of this 
paper and will not be discussed at length. 
 78.  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137(1970); see also Petragnani, supra note 
20, at 1218–19; see also Astringer, supra note 23, at 279–80.  
 79.  Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); see also Campbell, supra note 
23, at 598–99. 
 80.  See Glosson, supra note 21, at 418 (arguing courts are generally very deferential to 
a state’s determination of legitimate interests of its residents).  
 81.  Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.10 § 2. 
 82.  City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978) (stating courts 
have given some leeway to this question in the past, since significant incidental burdens on 
interstate commerce may be unavoidable where the state is attempting to safeguard the 
safety of its people, as would be the case here).  
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providing a greater means of control over that data. As such, the CCPA 
burdens companies inside and outside California by requiring: the 
recording, storage, and protection of various personal data; forcing 
companies, large and small, to collect, respond to, and act on various 
consumer requests for deletion or access; and the tracking of sales or 
transfer of personal so that companies can properly forward deletion 
requests to the appropriate third-parties.83 This significant burden could 
easily be found to be excessive when compared with the relatively paltry 
benefit conferred to consumers. 
Additionally, beyond the Pike balancing test, there is a third test which 
courts may apply when considering the DCC. As stated by the court in 
Healy, state legislation can also be invalidated where the “practical 
effect . . . is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”84 Here, 
it could be argued by those opposed to the legislation that the actual effect 
of the CCPA is to regulate the conduct of businesses outside California. 
Since the CCPA is primarily focused on protecting consumers and applies 
to most companies which “do business in California,85“ a large percentage 
of the companies that will be affected and must alter their conduct may be 
located outside the state’s boundaries. This reflects inherent problems with 
the internet. First, since the internet is global, it is accessible from 
anywhere,86 allowing consumers in California to access the website (and in 
turn data collecting sphere) of businesses that may not have anticipated 
serving Californians. Second it is usually difficult, if not impossible, for 
users (and in turn companies) to identify the location of visitors to various 
websites or online services.87 As such, in order to be safe, most companies 
would have to implement procedures designed to comply with the CCPA. 
As a caveat to the second problem, the use of geolocation data and 
technologies has become prevalent by online businesses. Such technologies 
allow a company to determine a visitor’s location, so in theory it is possible 
to know whether or not a visiting consumer is from California, and whether 
or not the company will be required to comply with the CCPA. However, 
this technology is rife with issues. First, assessment of geolocation 
technologies requires collection of particular data in the first place, not only 
requiring companies to still comply with the CCPA (albeit to a lesser 
degree) but also bringing forth further constitutional issues, since forcing 
 
 83.  See supra Part I.  
 84.  Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., supra note 79, at 336. 
 85.  Cahill et al., supra note 52, at 12. 
 86.  See Campbell, supra note 23, at 598–99. 
 87.  See Campbell, supra note 23, at 598–99. 
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use of geolocation is discriminatory on its face.88 The use of geolocation 
data also adds an extra burden to smaller companies who do not already 
have the infrastructure in place to implement geolocation technologies, 
since now they will be forced between implementing these strict CCPA 
guidelines for all customers or putting into place a potentially expensive 
new procedure for determining user locations.89 
The First Amendment 
Under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission of New York, regulation of 
commercial speech is governed by a four-factor test:90 (1) the regulated 
speech concerns lawful activity, (2) the regulation is supported by a 
substantial government interest, (3) the regulation directly advances the 
interest, and (4) the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve 
that interest.91 The court in Sorrell v. IMS Health later heightened the 
scrutiny for regulations concerning personal data,92 but even under this less 
exacting standard the CCPA will encounter significant hurdles in this area. 
The first factor poses little issue. The collection and use of personal 
data is certainly a lawful, though often criticized, behavior. Under current 
U.S. law, collection of a consumer’s personal data after obtaining consent 
(even if that consent is not properly informed93) is certainly legal, 
especially considering the low threshold for valid consent.94 The CCPA 
should also have no issue with the second factor since, as discussed above, 
protection of personal data is certainly a substantial government interest. 
Although targeted at a broad range of consumers, a general privacy interest 
has been recognized throughout the United States. 
The third factor is where the CCPA will run into serious issues. The 
CCPA’s main focus is transparency, and while important, transparency by 
itself does little to directly advance the government’s interest in protecting 
personal data. While it is true that the CCPA contains other means of 
 
 88.  Glosson, supra note 21, at 421–23. 
 89.  Glosson, supra note 21, at 427–32. 
 90.  447 U.S. 557 (1980).  
 91.  Id. at 564.  
 92.  564 U.S. 552 (2011).  
 93.  See generally Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 
(1994).  
 94.  See, e.g., Christopher Hopkins, Florida Court Rules on Enforceability of 
“Browsewrap” vs. “Clickwrap” Website Terms and Conditions, BUS. ADVOCATE (Feb. 17, 
2017), https://mcdonaldhopkins.com/Insights/Blog/Litigation-Trends/2017/02/17/Florida-co 
urt-rules-on-enforceability-of-browsewrap-vs-clickwrap-website-terms-and-conditions.  
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redress for consumers,95 such means are relatively ineffective in their 
current form. This means that the only true direct advancement of data 
protection the CCPA contains are its transparency provisions.96 
Finally, with regard to the fourth factor, the CCPA again falls short. It 
broadly applies to essentially all businesses, imposing rather strict 
punishments and fines for failure to comply in addition to requiring 
implementation what could be relatively burdensome infrastructure 
requirements. All of this, though, doesn’t properly serve the government’s 
interest, and to the minor amount that it does, overbroadly affects not only 
California businesses and consumers but also out-of-state actors. 
Overall, when considering the issue of commercial speech, which in 
this situation is related to the use and sale of personal data, it would appear 
that the CCPA again fails to overcome the constitutional issue. Since the 
collection and sale of personal data is, generally, legal, businesses are free 
to use that information as they see fit and the CCPA does not narrowly 
tailor its solutions to fit within the confines of the Constitution. 
The Spread of Data Protection Laws 
Thus far, this paper has analyzed the CCPA in two distinct ways. First, 
it analyzed whether the CCPA as currently written provides adequate and 
desirable data protection. Although, under the three-part framework used, 
the CCPA shows clear deficiencies with regard to actually protecting 
consumer data. Second, this paper also analyzed potential constitutional 
challenges that the CCPA, in its current form, will likely face. Once again, 
the CCPA showed clear deficiencies, as there are very severe doubts as to 
whether or not it could withstand those constitution challenges. 
Putting those two Parts aside, this Part will analyze how laws like the 
CCPA could potentially spread throughout the United States.97 First, this 
Part will analyze how comparable laws, laws regarding data breach 
notification, spread throughout the United States after California 
spearheaded the effort. Next, this part will predict likely changes that 
would be made to the CCPA should the state choose to adopt similar 
legislation. 
 
 95.  See CCPA §§ 1798.105, .120.  
 96.  Id. §§ 1798.110, .115, .130. 
 97.  For the moment, this paper ignores the question of whether or not consumers want 
a law like the CCPA to spread. It will take for granted (for this Part) that laws like the 
CCPA are desirable throughout the United States and proceed from there.  
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The Spread of Data Breach Notification Laws 
Much like with the CCPA, California was the first state to enact a data 
breach notification law, S.B. 1386, in 2002.98 Not long after this, the law 
was put to the test, as various companies were forced to disclose breaches 
of consumer data.99 Under this law, a breach was defined as the 
“unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the 
security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information100 maintained 
by the person or business.”101 In the event of a breach, notification must be 
provided promptly, in either writing or electronically.102 Since passage of a 
data breach notification law by Alabama in 2018, all 50 states have passed 
their own data breach notification laws.103 
Most of these laws are modeled after California’s law, since California 
was the “pioneer,”104 but many states have crafted specific differences into 
their laws as well.105 While a comprehensive discussion of all the 
differences in data breach notification laws throughout all fifty states is 
beyond the scope of this article,106 some of the major deviations will be 
explained as they will inform on possible deviations that states will take 
with respect to the CCPA. 
The first major deviation from California S.B. 1386 is the 
categorization of what type of data must be subject to a security breach in 
 
 98.  See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.80–.84 (West 2017). 
 99.  Joerling, supra note 24, at 468–70 (2010) (describing disclosure of data breaches 
by various companies, including ChoicePoint, Bank of America, PayMaxx, DSW, and 
LexisNexis).  
 100.  “Personal information” is itself defined as “an individual’s first name or first initial 
and last name in combination with [their] . . . Social security number . . . [d]river’s license 
number . . . credit or debit card number . . . [m]edical information . . . [h]ealth insurance 
information . . . [or] data collected through . . . an automated license plate recognition 
system.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(e) (West 2017).  
 101.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(d).  
 102.  Joerling, supra note 24, at 472.  
 103.  Caleb Saketh & Brooke Kahn, State Data Breach Notification Laws: 2018 in 
Review, COVINGTON: INSIDE PRIVACY (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-
security/data-breaches/state-data-breach-notification-laws-2018-in-review/; see also DAVIS 
WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP, SUMMARY OF U.S. STATE DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION STATUTES 
(Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.dwt.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/State%20Sta 
tutes/BreachNoticeSummaries.pdf.  
 104.  Brandon Faulkner, Hacking into Data Breach Notification Laws, 59 FLA. L. REV. 
1097, 1105 (2007). 
 105.  Joerling, supra note 24, at 473.  
 106.  See generally DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP, supra note 103 (discussing the data 
breach notification laws of all fifty states).  
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order to trigger notification duties.107 Under the California law, only data 
stored electronically is subject to notification requirements.108 However, 
several states (including North Carolina and Hawaii) have expanded the 
requirement to non-electronic means of storage, including paper records.109 
This expansion of applicability has a major advantage over California’s 
law: comprehensiveness. Particularly, in the Big Data context, data in the 
aggregate, even where individual pieces may be harmless, can easily be 
used to identify (and in turn harm) an individual.110 Therefore, notification 
of breaches regarding a wider swath of data (though this may be more 
expensive)111 helps to give notice to consumers whose (non-electronically 
stored) data has now been disseminated and which could, in combination 
with other freely available possibly also leaked data could result in harm to 
them. 
The second major deviations that states have made from the California 
data breach notification law refer to the exemptions that are included within 
the law.112 The most prominent exception113 is for a breach of encrypted 
data.114 States in general seem to assume that, so long as data in encrypted, 
a security breach involving that data need not be disclosed to the 
consumers whose data is encrypted. Unlike with anonymized data,115 
encrypted data is incredibly difficult (and in some cases practically 
impossible116) to crack without access to its encryption key.117 But a second 
major exemption, not shared by all states, is an exemption for breaches 
which “[have] not resulted or [are] unlikely to result in harm” to the 
 
 107.  Joerling, supra note 24, at 473. 
 108.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(a)-(d). 
 109.  Joerling, supra note 24, at 474 n. 37.  
 110.  See Paul Ohm, Broken promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure 
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704–06 (2010). 
 111.  See Kathryn E. Picanso, Protecting Information Security Under a Uniform Data 
Breach Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 363, 387 (2006).[DELETE] 
 112.  Joerling, supra note 24, at 475.  
 113.  Id. (clarifying that the most prominent exemption refers to all data breach 
notification laws and not just California Data Breach Notification laws). 
 114.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 1 (2007); see also N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 
899-aa (McKinney 2009). 
 115.  See Generally OHM, supra note 104 (stating that anonymized data, in the 
aggregate, can be used to identify an individual). 
 116.  Shubham Barot, Why Hackers Can’t Hack Encrypted Datas?, QUORA (Apr. 20, 
2016), https://www.quora.com/Why-Hackers-cant-hack-encrypted-datas.  
 117.  Cassie Philips, Is Encryption Enough To Protect Yourself?, DATAMOTION (NOV. 
11, 2016), https://www.datamotion.com/2016/11/encryption-enough-protect/.  
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affected individuals.118 While, on its face, such an exemption would seem 
to make sense, when considered in the broader context of data protection, 
the exemption again exposes consumers to unnecessary risks. 
While a single piece of data, on its own, may pose very little risk of 
harm, data in the aggregate (as previously discussed) can create a new and 
much more serious risk of harm.119 Businesses simply cannot keep track of 
which various piece of personal data that already exist in cyberspace; 
therefore, they cannot accurately access the risk that breach of a single 
piece of innocuous data can cause since they don’t know how that single bit 
of information may be aggregated with other information.120 So allowing 
this exemption for pieces of data which a business has determined to be 
unimportant creates new risks, because now enough data could be released 
piecemeal by various businesses to cause consumer harm, while at the 
same time the consumers themselves are not made aware of any breaches, 
since each one on its own does not pose a significant risk. 
The final major variation between state data breach notification laws 
is their enforcement mechanisms.121 California’s law, for example, allows a 
private right of action by individuals whose data has been subject to a 
security breach and who were not properly notified.122 On the other hand, 
some states (like Florida) only allow for an administrative fine and do not 
create a separate, private right of action.123 In the context of data breaches, 
though, where security breaches can affect hundreds of thousands (or even 
millions) of people,124 the ability to bring a private cause of action is vital, 
especially the ability to bring a class action lawsuit.125 Class actions are 
 
 118.  Joerling, supra note 24, at 475. 
 119.  See Ohm, supra note 110, at 1729–30.  
 120.  See Nehf, supra note 29, at 22. 
 121.  These differ significantly from the federal government’s approach to enforcement, 
where the FTC has taken on a role as the de facto regulatory agency for cybersecurity. 
Marcus, supra note 17, at 579; see also GINA STEVENS, DATA SECURITY BREACH 
NOTIFICATION LAWS (2012). 
 122.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798(b), (e).  
 123.  Joerling, supra note 24, at 479. 
 124.  See David McCandles, Tom Evans, Paul Barton & Stephanie Tomasevic, World’s 
Biggest Data Breaches & Hacks, INFO. is beautiful, https://informationisbeautiful.net/ 
visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/ (last updated Apr. 1, 2019); see also 
Jonathan Stempel, Yahoo Strikes $117.5 Million Data Breach Settlement After Earlier 
Accord Rejected, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-verizon-yaho 
o/yahoo-in-new-117-5-million-data-breach-settlement-after-earlier-accord-rejected-idUSK 
CN1RL1H1. 
 125.  Craig A. Newman, The Next Big Thing: Data Breach Securities Class Action 
Litigation, PATTERSON BELKNAP: DATA SECURITY LAW BLOG (Feb. 20, 2018), https:// 
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important for two reasons. First, an individual consumer rarely has the 
resources to bring a suit on their own and oftentimes have mixed success in 
court.126 Second, security breaches are inherently a class related harm. As 
previously mentioned, it is rare that a single individual’s data is leaked, but 
usually on the order of hundreds of thousands of individuals. Allowing 
class action in the event of data breaches thus makes it significantly easier 
to establish the fact of injury, since it can build upon the aggregate 
experiences of an entire class.127 
While these three deviations are particular to the data breach 
notification context, they can certainly help inform on how states may 
approach variations to data protection laws (like the CCPA) should they 
choose to adopt them in the future. 
Potential Variations to the CCPA 
As the last section (briefly) discussed, while all states have adopted 
similar data breach notification laws, there are a few significant variations 
between those laws which can make a huge difference to the proper 
protection of consumers’ data.128 There is little reason to suspect that states 
’will not make similar deviations from data protection laws as those laws 
spread throughout the states.129 
Regarding applicability of such laws, this is the area where one 
expects the least variation in state practice. While it is true that some data 
may still be stored on paper, in the modern world almost all data is stored 
electronically.130 The CCPA specifically targets electronically stored data 
as well, since it is the location and transmission of such information that 
the law seeks to target. The ubiquity of such data storage has only 




 126.  See, e.g., Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 806 F. Supp. 2d 452, 455 (D. Mass. 2011).  
 127.  See generally Nicholas Green, Standing in the Future: The Case for a Substantial 
Risk Theory of “Injury In Fact” in Consumer Data Breach Class Actions, 58 B.C. L. REV. 
287 (2017).  
 128.  See Burdon, supra note 42, at 73–79. 
 129.  In fact, some states have already begun consideration of data protection laws, so 
this spread may occur sooner than we imagine, though none have had the same fanfare as 
the CCPA. See JONATHAN G. CEDARBAUM, D. REED FREEMAN, JR. & LYDIA LICHLYTER, 
WILMERHALE, PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY ALERT: STATES CONSIDER PRIVACY 
LEGISLATION IN THE WAKE OF CALIFORNIA’S CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT (2019). 
 130.  See Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1043 (Penn. 2018) (acknowledging that 
most data is stored electronically). 
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passed.131 Therefore, there is no reason to expect the same deviation for 
written data that is seen in the data breach notification context. 
Regarding exemptions, the second major state deviation for data 
breach notification laws and data protection laws face a very different set 
of risks and considerations. Unlike data breaches, where encryption can 
help protect individuals‘ data, in the data protection context, exceptions for 
encrypted data do not tackle the fundamental issue with improper 
collection and use. Even where data is encrypted, states should not 
(although they very well might) allow for the free sale and use of such 
personal data, not because of the risk to consumers, but rather because it 
violates the rights of consumers (regardless of encryption). The other major 
exemption which states might adopt is an exemption for de minimis data, 
which would again be trivial in a data protection context. The underlying 
purpose of the CCPA is to ensure transparency and (minimal) control of 
personal data. It is meant to allow for a consumer to know, correct, and if 
necessary, delete all personal data held by companies. Allowing for a de 
minimis exemption would essentially defeat the purpose since, apart from a 
few big players,132 many companies only collect and use only relatively 
small amounts of data on their own and often use it in connection with 
other companies.133 
The final deviation that state data protection acts will likely take 
regards enforcement. The CCPA, as it currently stands, only allows for a 
private right of action after notifying (and denial by) the State Attorney 
General.134 Not only does this create an unnecessary delay, but it also 
allows for the Attorney General to essentially short-circuit potential claims 
by informing business who may be out of compliance of the potential 
lawsuit, which grants them a grace period to correct the conduct in order to 
escape liability. Should other states begin adoption of data protection laws, 
they should certainly not follow the CCPA’s example. Instead, they should 
either implement administrative fine systems, which create punishments for 
 
 131.  See Loren F. Selznick & Carolyn LaMacchia, Cybersecurity Liability: How 
Technically Savvy Can We Expect Small Business Owners to Be, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 217 
(2018).  
 132.  See, e.g., Aaron Brown, The Amount of Data Facebook Collects from Your Photos 
Will TERRIFY You, EXPRESS (Jan. 6, 2017, 12:12 PM), https://www.express.co.uk/life-
style/science-technology/751009/Facebook-Scan-Photos-Data-Collection. 
 133.  See Amy Talbot, Infographic, Most Companies Are Collecting Data, But Aren’t 
Using Big Data Solutions, ZDNET (Sept. 1, 2017, 1:12 PM).  
 134.  Although this requirement may soon be changing as California politicians seem to 
have realized the harm that could come of such a convoluted system. See Joseph J. 
Lazzarotti, Jason C. Gavejian & Maya Atrakchi, California AG Announces Amendment to 
the CCPA, NAT’L LAW REVIEW (Feb. 26, 2019). 
3 - PALMIERI_HSTLJ11-1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/4/2019  9:57 AM 
Winter 2020] WHO SHOULD REGULATE DATA? 59 
each individual violation (with no actual grace period for exemption), or 
allow solely for private causes of action, without oversight from the 
Attorney General. Within the data protection context, class actions are 
much less important. Unlike data breaches, which almost always implicate 
a large number of consumers, data protection is a much more personal 
concern. The ability of a single individual to much more easily bring forth 
a claim against a company is vitally important—especially in combination 
with potential administrative fines for relatively simple to prove violations. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, this paper comes to two primary 
conclusions. First, while the CCPA is a step in the right direction with 
regard to data protection within the United States, it still has a long way to 
go before it can adequately protect the personal data of consumers. As 
such, the law in its current form acts merely as a transparency law for 
Californian consumers and is truly not a system that consumers would want 
the country to adopt, at least as the law currently stands. Second, even if the 
law were to provide adequate safeguards, it could also face significant 
constitutional challenges. As the law currently stands, there is little 
certainty that it could overcome these challenges, although ultimately, it is 
difficult to say with certainty how such constitutional discussions would 
resolve themselves. 
That being said, these critiques do not necessarily mean the end of the 
CCPA or of laws like it. Other states, following California’s lead many still 
adopt data protection laws of their own. Following a similar trend as when 
the states adopted data breach notification laws, these data protection laws 
will likely contain the same broad principles as the CCPA but with some 
very important variations. While the deviations are important in the data 
breach context, they do not perfectly map onto a data protection context, 
but would still provide very important and necessary protections. These 
deviations, however, might also cause more problems than they solve, since 
they may put into place disparate requirements, making compliance with all 
laws incredibly difficult, and consequently leading again to Dormant 







 135.  See Marcus, supra note 17, at 575–80; see also Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 
125, at 224–29. 
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